Warren Buffett is a long-term investor, but is required by law to disclose his trades on a quarterly basis. The market seems to under-react to the revelation of his trades. From 1980 to 2006, it has been possible to achieve investment results similar to Buffett's own simply by following his trades disclosed by Berkshire Hathaway. We consider overconfidence by sophisticated market participants as a contributing factor to the apparent under reaction to information contained in public disclosures of changes in Berkshire Hathaway's holdings of stocks. Net sales of corporate insiders of stocks held by Berkshire Hathaway tend to decrease when those holdings increase consistent with shared private information. However, financial analysts' recommendations tend to downgrade and institutions tend to sell at those times. This behavior by analysts and fund managers is consistent with pejorative experts displaying overconfidence by over estimating their stock picking abilities or precision of their independent private information and, as a consequence, underweighting public information in making their decisions.
1.

Introduction
Warren Buffett, Chairman and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, is widely respected for his investment acumen. Berkshire Hathaway's portfolio of publicly traded stocks has substantially outperformed the market during his tenure. Assuming Buffett's success is attributable to superior information, the rationale for Berkshire Hathaway holding positions beyond public disclosure of trades based on that information is puzzling.
1 An efficient market, in the semistrong form, would quickly drive equilibrium prices to reflect the information content of such disclosures, implying no further benefit should be in the offing. 2 Moreover, if the market under reacts, then given required quarterly disclosure of portfolio changes, it would seem a simple matter to mimic that strategy and achieve quite similar success. Accordingly, one would expect that sophisticated market participants would quickly dissipate any inefficiency of that nature.
However, as we will show, this does not occur.
If the market under reacts to public disclosures, then it makes sense for Buffett to hold positions until the market price fully adjusts to the information that may be driving Berkshire
Hathaway's investments. What is unexplained is the under reaction. An explanation that we pursue in this study is overconfidence on the part of market participants such as financial analysts and institutional fund managers whose recommendations and trades are most likely to influence prices. Theoretical models by Odean (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subramanyan 1 Closely related to an informational advantage per se is the prospect that Buffett's influence on managerial decisions for companies in which he has a stake improves future cash flows. Information in this context can be interpreted as foreknowledge of the opportunity to exercise such influence. Public disclosure of Buffett having taken a position would then signal a change in expected future cash flows rather than better information about future cash flows sans any influence.
2 Abnormal returns up to the time of public disclosure can be viewed as compensation for incurring costs to acquire private information (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980) and, hence, entirely consistent with market efficiency.
(1998), analyzing the consequences of investor overconfidence in the form of overestimation of precision of their private information, predict an initial under-reaction to public information followed by a future drift in prices as the market ultimately adjusts. Moreover, similar to overconfidence in the sense of Odean (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subramanyan (1998) , financial analysts and fund managers may believe their independent judgment is superior and seek to distinguish their expertise by purposefully not mimicking others such as Buffett. Both interpretations are treated as coming under the same rubric of overconfidence.
We begin our analysis by documenting abnormal returns to portfolios that that mimic Berkshire Hathaway's holdings of publicly traded stocks formed following quarterly disclosures during a sample period from 1980 to 2006. Such abnormal returns are remarkably similar in magnitude to those earned by Berkshire's portfolio, and they are independent of other wellknown pricing anomalies. We then take an event study approach and examine price reactions in windows surrounding public disclosure of changes in holdings. While we find evidence of information content to such disclosures in short windows, price reactions at that time are incomplete as implied by abnormal returns from mimicking portfolios over longer windows.
Next, we investigate overconfidence on the part of sell-side financial analysts and institutional fund managers by examining changes in recommendations and institutional holdings in relation to changes in Berkshire Hathaway's portfolio. In both cases, we find either no significant reaction or evidence of contrarian behavior: analysts tend to downgrade their recommendations following increases in Berkshire Hathaway's holdings and institutions appear to take the other side of Berkshire Hathaway's trades by selling when Berkshire Hathaway is buying. 3 These findings we ascribe to overconfidence instilled by competition and high rewards for these activities in the investment community.
At the outset, we acknowledge the alternative explanation for Berkshire Hathaway's performance as measured by abnormal returns consistent with market efficiency is that Buffett's success is due to chance. The fact that our choice to examine Buffett's record is ex post implies that selection bias is clearly an issue. If Buffett's success is due to chance, then investors could rationally choose not to mimic despite his past performance. We offer the following counter arguments: First, we observe that in the several years preceding the principal time frame of our study, Berkshire Hathaway experienced remarkable annual returns of approximately 60%, establishing Buffett's sobriquet as the "Oracle of Omaha" and suggesting unusual stock picking ability. Second, Martin and Puthenpurackal (2008) conduct a Monte Carlo simulation based on an approach introduced by Marcus (1980) and report that the probability that luck could have produced a similar performance to that of Berkshire Hathaway's portfolio over the same years as our study is less than one-percent. Accordingly, a strong ex ante case for investors to have recognized Buffett's performance by 1980 as indicative of his ability and considered mimicking his trades. Last, we find similar under reaction for institutions in the highest quintile ranking of past performance excluding Berkshire Hathaway, suggesting that under reaction to superior performance by fund managers in general is not unusual.
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The remainder of our study is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of related literature; section 3 describes our data; section 4 contains our results; and section 5 concludes.
2.
Related Literature
Market Under-Reaction
Martin and Puthenpurkal (2008) conduct a comprehensive study of Berkshire Hathaway's performance over the same sample period as our study. Among other results, they find that a portfolio that mimics Berkshire Hathaway's investments in publicly traded stocks rebalanced at the beginning of months following public disclosure earns significantly positive annualized abnormal returns of about 5.3% estimated using Carhart's (1997) four-factor model. 5 As mentioned above, a distinctive feature of their analysis of whether Berkshire Hathaway's superior performance could be attributable to chance is a Monte Carlo simulation in which they report a likelihood ranging from .01% to .64% depending on how many hypothetical managers are assumed in the competition. Their interest does not extend to tests for overconfidence as a possible explanation for Buffett's long-term strategy.
Previous research has detected market under reaction to public disclosures of various types including book to market ratios (Fama and French 1993) , earnings announcements (Bernard and Thomas 1989) , dividend initiations (Michaely, Womack, and Thaler 1995) , accounting accruals (Sloan 1996) , sales growth (La Porta 1996), analysts' recommendations (Michaely and Womack 1999) , asset investments (Titman, Wei, and Xie 2001), and leverage (Penman, Richardson, and Tuna 2007) . Given the possible co-incidence of these anomalies, as well as price momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993) and price volatility (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang 2006) , we consider the extent to which changes in Berkshire Hathaway's holdings and future returns may be associated with variables that capture these anomalies including book-5 As we later report, this result is similar to our estimate of 5.52% using Carhart's model.
to-price ratio, market capitalization, accrual component of earnings, five-year sales growth, change in capital assets, leverage ratio, past returns, and standard error of market model residuals. As we report later, while mimicking portfolio composition and abnormal returns in our study are sensitive to some of these variables, changes in Berkshire Hathaway's holdings contribute to those returns after controlling for other anomalies.
More to our conjecture, evidence of market under reaction to public information from the literature on pricing anomalies is fairly ubiquitous suggesting the likelihood of some common behavioral factor such as investor overconfidence could be present.
Investor Overconfidence
There is substantial evidence in psychology of overconfidence in a number of forms.
Relative to a certain benchmark, physicians overestimate accuracy of diagnoses (ChistensenSzalanski and Busyhead 1981), workers overestimate the speed with which they can complete tasks (Buehler, Griffin, and Ross 1994) , and individuals in general overestimate their control over events (Presson and Benassi 1996) . Relative to a comparison group, substantially more than 50% of automobile drivers believe themselves to be better than the median (Svenson 1981), more than 35% of engineers place themselves among the top 5% of firm performers (Zenger 1992) , and 25% of high school seniors rate themselves in the top 1% in the ability to get along with others (College Board 1976 -1977 . Hence, it seems that overconfidence is quite pervasive as a characteristic of human behavior in general.
Of special interest to our study is overconfidence in the form of individuals overestimating the precision of their information (Alpert and Raiffa 1982; Klayman, Soll, Gonzales-Vallejo, and Barlas 1999; and Soll and Klayman 2004) . The connection between the tendency toward overestimating precision of private information and market under reaction observed in studies of pricing anomalies is made theoretically by Odean (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subramanyan (1998) . Both studies interpret overconfidence as an overweighting of private information and consequent underweighting of public information in trading decisions.
The result of such asymmetric weighting is a positive correlation between consecutive changes in asset prices. In the context of our study, this phenomenon translates into analysts and fund managers underweighting the information content of changes in Berkshire Hathaway's portfolio resulting in persistence of abnormal returns on mimicking portfolios formed up to a year following public disclosure. Seyhun (1998) At a more tangential level, recently, theorists have examined the effects of overconfidence within the construct of formal asset pricing theory as a possible explanation for 6 We also note that the public record of insider trading may serve as a further reflection of insiders' private information and, hence, that of Buffett's to other market participants. However, overconfidence of officers and directors may more likely be manifest in operating decisions wherein lies their expertise than in person portfolio decisions.
price bubbles. In this regard, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) point to investor overconfidence as a source of differences in opinion that, in turn, can cause the price of an asset to exceed the highest estimate of its intrinsic value. This work is a continuous time extension of Harrison and Kreps (1978) who observed that differences in opinion along with short sale constraints can induce bubbles within which investors buy overpriced assets under the belief that other traders are willing to pay even higher prices. While we distinguish between market under reaction and asset bubbles, the common element is that investor overconfidence in a broad sense that includes differences in opinion may play a significant role in trading decisions or recommendations.
As one of the most successful investors of all time, Buffett has been extensively studied by practitioners and biographers. Among many publications that seek to extract useful insights form 
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Since 1979, Berkshire Hathaway has been required to provide quarterly reports of its security holdings to the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). We obtain the content of those reports from Thomson Financial's data base of 13f filings over the period from April, 1980 to December, 2006 . In all, we extract 2,140 quarter-stock observations on publicly traded holdings. We add 275 observations for which Berkshire Hathaway has received SEC approval for confidential treatments that, as a consequence, surface in later reports. We obtain stock price and returns data from the CRSP monthly tape and financial data from COMPUSTAT's industrial, full coverage, and research tapes. We lose 66 and 97 observations for lack of data on CRSP and COMPUSTAT, respectively, leaving us with a total sample consisting of 2,252 observations. We obtain stock recommendations from the I/B/E/S summary file. Last, we obtain trading data on corporate insiders (officers, directors, and owners of 10% or more of equity class securities) starting in January, 1985 from the CDA/Investment section of Thompson/First Call. and coded analysts' recommendations. Berkshire Hathaway's holdings are similar to the S&P 500 and quite different from the COMPUSTAT universe. The similarity with the S&P 500 and the relatively low book-to-price ratios of Berkshire Hathaway's holdings runs counter to the popular view of Buffet as a value investor in the traditional sense, but is consistent with his claim of having switched from "cigarette butts" to "great companies at a fair price" (Buffett and Cunningham 2008) . We note that analysts' recommendations are somewhat contrarian in the sense of being lower for Berkshire Hathaway's holdings than for the S&P 500. Measured on a five-point scale ranging from strong buy to strong sell, the median recommendations are 2.26 and 2.13, respectively.
(Insert Table 1 
Empirical Findings
Buffett's Performance
We first estimate abnormal returns to a portfolio that mimics Berkshire Hathaway's holdings of publicly traded stocks by employing Carhart's (1997) four factor model: The results are reported in Table 2 .
(Insert Table 2 about here)
Panel A contains the estimates of abnormal returns for the portfolio mimicking Berkshire
Hathaway's holdings of publicly traded stocks. The results are not sensitive to which of the three starting date assumptions is employed. Similar to Martin and Puthenpurkal (2008) , estimates of Jensen's alpha imply average annualized abnormal returns across the three regressions of approximately 6% and 6.6% for the value-and equal-weighted mimicking portfolios, respectively. The difference in abnormal returns suggests that stocks of smaller companies performed better than those of larger companies. The two mimicking portfolios differ somewhat in their exposure to risks captured by SMB and MOM with the value (equal) weighted portfolio having significantly negative (insignificant) exposure to the former and insignificant (significantly negative) exposure to the latter. More notably, the lower book-to-market ratio, but significantly positive exposure to HML is likely a manifestation of the subtle difference between 7 We obtained factor returns data from French's website. 8 The equally weight approach eliminates a size effect apart from control in the form of a size factor. Also, we note that changes in the mimicking portfolio weights are solely an artifact of stocks entering or exiting Berkshire Hathaway's portfolio. This independence of price changes per se may better capture actual trades.
risk-factor and firm-characteristic based explanations for predictable stock returns (Fama and French 1993; Daniel and Titman 1997) .
The results in Panel B on the performance of Berkshire Hathaway as a whole are sensitive to the time frame employed. Given that the limitation to availability of quarterly SEC filings does not apply, we can estimate abnormal returns for the period commencing in 1976.
The annualized abnormal return over the entire period is 12%, a remarkable record notwithstanding that abnormal return for 1976-1979 is 60%. Restricting the sample period to 1980-2006, the abnormal return is 7.2% compared to 6-6.6% for the mimicking portfolio reflecting the leverage employed by Berkshire Hathaway. We also note a drop in the significance level for Jensen's alpha due to the higher volatility of Berkshire Hathaway's stock compared to that of its asset portfolio.
A natural question in assessing the source of abnormal returns in either Panel A or B is whether Buffett has been exploiting other well known empirically documented anomalies. In addressing this question, we identify variables intended to capture the anomalies mentioned earlier:
B/P: Book-to-price ratio. Book value is from last fiscal year and price data is from the last month prior to the event quarter;
Size: Log market capitalization at the beginning the event quarter;
Acc:
Accounting accruals in the most recent annual earnings, measured as the change in non-cash current assets minus depreciation and the change in current liabilities, excluding the current portion of long-term debts and tax payables. We standardized by the average total assets in the past two years.
Ltsg: Annualized annual sales growth rate in the past five years.
ΔPPE: Change in gross property, plant and equipment from the previous year, standardized by the average total assets in the last two years.
Xret: Market adjusted returns in the past 12 months before the event quarter.
Lev: Leverage equal to book value of debt in the latest annual report divided by the market capitalization before the event quarter;
Vol: Volatility measured by the standard deviation of the stock's idiosyncratic risk. We take the 36 monthly stock returns before the event date and run a market model to derive residuals, and use root mean squared error to measure volatility.
In order to reduce the influence of outliers, we rank transform the above variables into values between zero and one.
The panels in Table 3 report three separate regressions. Regression 1 seeks to examine whether Buffett is exploiting some known anomalies in his stock selection. The dependent variable (Sample-id) is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if it the stock is in Buffett's portfolio and zero otherwise. In regressions 2 and 3, the dependent variable is the future 12-month stock return after each reporting quarter. While Regression 2 documents the return predicting power of the independent variables during the sample period, Regression 3 examines whether Buffett's stock picking ability is subsumed by these known anomalies. A la Fama and MacBeth (1973) , the regressions are run quarterly and tests of average coefficients are based on Newy-West corrected t-statistics. Table 3 presents our results in two panels; Panel A without also including industry dummies to control for industry fixed effects and Panel B including industry dummies.
(Insert Table 3 about here) From Panel A, Regression 1, we see significant correlations of changes in Berkshire
Hathaway's stock holdings with variables serving as proxies for several anomalies. The results from Regression 2 are broadly consistent with previous studies; negative associations of future returns with accounting accruals, asset investments, and size and a positive association with book-to-market. These findings suggest that Buffett's stock picking ability may be related to exploiting anomalies. However, comparing results of Regressions 1 and 2, it appears that Buffett avoids firms with high asset growth that under-perform the market and invests in large firms with low book-to-market ratios and large accounting accruals, characteristics generally associated with low returns. The negative coefficient on book to market ratio in Regression 1 is, again, noteworthy since this variable is often taken to signify value stocks. While Buffett has been viewed as a value investor, this result is consistent with the shift in his strategy mentioned earlier.
The significant positive coefficient on the indicator variable in Regression 3 suggests that Buffett trading reflects unique insights that contribute to the generation of future returns.
Recall from Table 1 that Berkshire Hathaway's portfolio has a clear emphasis on banking, business services, insurance, and publishing suggesting that the results in Panel A could be influenced by industry factors. It is evident from Panel B that some but not all future returns may be a consequence of successful bets on industries.
Market Under-reaction
The results in 3.1 depict Buffet's impressive ability to generate superior returns over a sustained period of time. We now consider the extent to which there exists a potentially exploitable price drift following public disclosure of changes in Berkshire Hathaway's portfolio holdings. Table 4 contains estimates of abnormal returns from mimicking portfolios formed up to 12 months succeeding quarterly 13f filings with the SEC, again, using Carhart's (1997) fourfactor model employing both value and equal weights. Results are reported for abnormal returns both with and without changes involving confidential treatments. Trades receiving confidential treatment are unobservable until later quarters where they can be inferred suggesting an unavoidable delay in attempts to mimic changes from such trades. However, the impact of including these trades is negligible.
(Insert Table 4 about here)
Because mutual fund managers have until 45 days after the end of a quarter to report their trades, it may not be possible to replicate abnormal returns realized during the first two months following the quarter in which changes in portfolio holdings occur. Notably, annualized abnormal returns on mimicking portfolios formed two months after disclosure are over 5%.
More remarkably, such returns are as high as approximately 4% when mimicking portfolios are formed a year following disclosure. As before, the under-reaction is somewhat stronger for the equally weighted portfolios as exhibited by slightly higher t-statistics.
As a complement to evidence of market under-reaction in the form of abnormal returns well after public disclosure, we examine reactions to the disclosures per se by conducting an events study approach in which we estimate market-adjusted returns (returns on traded stocks net of returns on CRSP's value-weighted portfolio) for 13f reported trades resulting in increases, no changes, decreases, and revelations of previous purchases receiving confidential treatment. Table 4 , in Panel B we see that market-adjusted returns are significantly positive for several quarters following disclosure for increases and no change. While market-adjusted returns in quarters leading up to disclosure are also significantly positive for no change, the magnitudes are smaller consistent with no change being viewed as good news as in Panel A.
Market-adjusted returns are also significantly positive for decreases in quarters following disclosure suggesting profitability to trades contrarian to those of Buffett.
Comparing the findings for short windows in Panel A with those of long windows in Panel B, we conclude that market reactions at the time of disclosure are incomplete. We next turn to our conjecture that the under reaction may be an artifact of over confidence on the parts of financial analysts and institutional fund managers.
Investor Overconfidence
As noted earlier, market under reaction is linked to investor overconfidence by Odean (1998) and Odean, Hirshleifer, and Subramanyan (1998) who demonstrate analytically that overconfidence in the form of over estimating the precision of one's private information can lead to under weighting of public information resulting in market under reaction as observed in many studies of pricing anomalies. We investigate whether overconfidence could explain why the abnormal returns to mimicking Buffet's trades as documented in section 4.2 do not disappear even over fairly protracted periods by examining the behavior of three classes of market participants: corporate insiders of firms for which Berkshire Hathaway has stock holdings, sellside financial analysts, and institutional fund managers.
Corporate insiders, defined as officers, directors, and major stockholders, are best positioned to have access to similar information to that of Buffett in the sense predicting future cash flows of their companies, or to draw inferences from the observation of Buffett's trades.
Accordingly, among classes of investors, it would seem that insiders are the most likely to emulate changes in Berkshire Hathaway's holdings of their stock and all the more if insiders are themselves overconfident. 9 However, it is also likely that either the order flow from insiders or the public record of their trades is insufficient to move prices to the point of incorporating all of the information that may be driving those changes. In that regard, we also note that market makers may be unable to disentangle diversification from exploiting bad news as the motive for insiders to sell. This suggests that mimicking by insiders is likely to be most discernible on the buy side where, as net sellers, insiders would sell less when Berkshire Hathaway's holdings increase.
9 CEOs, who under exercise their stock options, have been characterized as overconfident by Malmendier and Tate (2005) . On one hand, given overlapping private information, overconfidence by insiders is likely to reinforce a tendency to trade in the same direction as Buffett's trades in their companies' stock. On the other hand, overconfidence of firm managers may relate more to operating decisions rather than to personal portfolio decisions.
In contrast, overconfidence seems likely to deter financial analysts and institutional fund managers, participants who may well affect prices through recommendations and trades, respectively, from following Buffett's lead. Analysts are likely to acquire their own information independent of Buffett and, if overconfident, may tend to overweight the precision of their information relative to information that is publicly available. As well, given that the investment field is highly competitive with out-sized rewards for distinctive success, analysts have strong incentives to distinguish their abilities apart from mimicking others in forming their stock recommendations, a factor that may contribute to the survivorship of those endowed with overconfidence. 10 Fund managers face similar conditions to those of analysts with respect to breeding overconfidence. Apart from overconfidence, however, fund managers' trading decisions may also be restricted by diversification and other constraints which could further mute their responses to public disclosures of changes in Berkshire Hathaway's holdings. In both cases, it is reasonable to anticipate that overconfidence might play a role with these participants as they react to the information content of Berkshire Hathaway's public disclosures. Table 6 reports our results on insider trading, analysts' recommendations, and changes in institutional holdings over seven quarters centered on the quarter in which Berkshire Hathaway's holdings changed. We tabulate trading by insiders by the following formula:
number of shares insiders buys -number of shares insiders sell number of shares insiders buys + number of shares insiders sell snis  We use a numerical scale for analysts' recommendations: 1-strong buy, 2-buy, 3-hold, 4-sell, and 5-strong sell and calculate a mean recommendation for analysts surveyed by I/B/E/S.
Institutional ownership changes are in the form of the quarterly change in all institutional
10 Another factor is that analysts' recommendations may be biased upward in order to covey favor with firm managers, thereby further muting responses to public information when that information implies bad news.
holdings the same stocks as Berkshire Hathaway excluding holdings of Berkshire Hathaway divided by total shares outstanding for those companies. Table 6 is divided into three panels, with Panels A, B and C presenting the evidence for share increases, no change, and decreases, respectively.
(Insert Table 6 about here) Consistent with there being information content to Buffet's trades shared or inferred by corporate insiders who, if overconfident, may even overweight that information, net sales by insiders decrease by 0.11 (significant at 5% level) in the same quarter as Berkshire Hathaway's holdings of stock in their companies increases. This decrease in net sales is short-lived suggesting that while Buffett's trades have an effect coincident with a favorable market reaction at that time, insiders are not exploiting the post disclosure price drift noted earlier possibly because maintaining an under diversified position for an extended period is not justified by the expected gains. Moving to Panels B and C, there appears to be no effect on disclosures of no change or decreases. This result is consistent with Table 5 , which finds significant positive results for share increases, but less significant results in unchanged positions and share decreases.
On average analysts revise their recommendations significantly downward in the quarter when Berkshire Hathaway's holdings increase and over the next three quarters suggesting that they place little if any weight on public disclosure of those changes.
11 Consistent with analysts' behavior, institutions appear to take small notice of Buffett's trades with fund managers, if anything, taking the opposite side of trades associated with increases in Berkshire Hathaway's holdings. To the extent that institutions are reacting positively to such increases, this does not 11 The same is observed for analyst recommendation for the unchanged case.
materialize until the third following quarter. As noted, insiders, analysts, and fund managers may have shorter horizons over which to realize the effects of their decisions than the periods necessary to take advantage information revealed by Berkshire Hathaway's disclosures.
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Financial analysts and institutional fund managers are prominent among classes of the investment community with an ability to move prices either through recommendations to large traders or through large trades. Yet, notwithstanding opportunities to follow the lead of one of the country's best known and most successful traders in modern times based on public information, these participants have not behaved in a manner that would resolve apparent market inefficiency as evidenced by post disclosure price drifts that persist for up to a year. While we cannot unambiguously establish that overconfidence is driving this phenomenon, our evidence suggests that this may be the case.
Last, we consider whether superior performance by other professional traders also is accompanied by market under reaction. For each month and institution, we step back and calculate abnormal returns for the previous 10 years. We then form quintile portfolios based on the rank order of those returns that mimic the holdings of institutions within those quintiles.
Finally, we regress monthly mimicking portfolio returns on Carhart's (1997) four factors. Table   7 contains our results. We observe that estimates of abnormal returns in the form of Jensen's alpha are non-decreasing and significantly positive for quintiles 4 and 5. Not surprisingly in light of Buffett's extraordinary performance, the magnitudes are smaller than those for portfolios mimicking Berkshire Hathaway's holdings. However, the presence of abnormal returns for past top performing institutions suggests that the market under reaction to public disclosures by professional investors is not confined to Berkshire Hathaway. Accordingly, the same arguments for overconfidence among sophisticated market participants as a plausible explanation would seem to apply.
(Insert Table 7 about here)
Conclusion
Behavioral finance offers a new perspective on market under reactions to public information. Taking our cue from Odean (1998) given the highly competitive investment community in which they perform and the high rewards afforded those who distinguish themselves as possessing independent expertise. As a complementary finding, insiders whose overconfidence is more likely to overweight similar private information to that of Buffett tend to follow Buffett's lead when buying by, as net sellers, selling less.
A useful extension of our study would be to identify a measure of overconfidence that could be applied to professional market participants thereby making it possible to conduct more refined cross-sectional assessments on our conjectured association between overconfidence and under reaction to public information. Panel A compares the portfolio's composition with the S&P 500 and the COMPUSTAT universe. In each firm-quarter, we match Berkshire Hathaway's holdings with the S&P 500 index and the COMPUSTAT universe and then calculate statistics for the pooled data. Size is the log of market cap measured one month before the holding quarter. The book-to-price ratio is based on book value from the most recent fiscal year and price from the last month before the holding quarter. Institutional ownership is all institutional holdings excluding Berkshire Hathaway's divided by the shares outstanding measured at the end of holding quarter. The analysts' recommendation score takes values between 1 and 5, where 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 correspond to strong-buy, buy, hold, sell, and strong-sell, respectively. Panel B reports the distribution of holding period lengths and numbers of stocks held by Berkshire Hathaway's. Panel C compares the industry distributions of Berkshire Hathaway's holdings, the S&P 500, and the COMPUSTAT universe according to Fama and French's (1997) The difference between the two panels is that industry dummies, according to the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry classification, are included in Panel B, but not in Panel A. In each panel, there are three regressions. In Regression 1, the dependent variable (Portfolio-id) is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if it the stock is in Berkshire Hathaway's portfolio and zero otherwise. In Regressions 2 and 3, the dependent variable is the future 12-month stock return after each reporting quarter. The independent variables are all standardized using rank transformation into fractions between zero and one. They include the portfolio dummy (Portfolio_id), accounting accruals (Acc), book to price ratio (B/P), annualized sales growth rate in the past 5 years (Ltsg), changes of property, plant and equipment in the previous year (ΔPPE), leverage (Lev), log market capitalization (Size1), volatility (Vol) and the market-adjusted stock return for the past 12 months (Xret_1) as well as the industry dummies (results omitted). Detailed definitions of variables are in the body. We estimate the regression coefficients on a quarterly basis using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) We form equally weighted (EW) and value weighted (VW) mimicking portfolios assuming that they are constructed at the end of each of one through 12 months after Berkshire Hathaway's filing. We report estimates of abnormal returns (alphas) and associated t-statistics using Carhart's (1997) four factor model: Both other insider snis and other institutional ownership change are detrended by its global mean at each quarter. The difference between quarter zero and the average of negative quarters, and the difference between the average of positive quarters and the average of negative quarters are reported. Statistics are based on two-tailed p value. ***,** and * denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (-10.16) 
